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Abstract 
 
This paper studies social welfare in a heterogeneous population under the criteria of efficiency 
and sustainable heterogeneity. As is well known, heterogeneity in time preference results in 
substantial inequality. This paper shows that, even if households have heterogeneous 
preferences, there is a balanced growth path on which all the optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are equally and indefinitely satisfied, and heterogeneity is sustainable 
on this path. The existence of a unique sustainable path will shed new light on social welfare 
issues, but this path cannot necessarily be naturally obtained by relying only on markets. 
Sustainable heterogeneity is politically fragile and requires rational―not unconditional 
―sacrifice and altruism, and interventions by the authority are justified. Sustainable 
heterogeneity indicates that globalization should be accompanied by measures that support 
developing countries and that a GDP modified for measures of sustainable heterogeneity may 
more correctly measure people’s “happiness.” However, it also indicates that inequality is 
necessary for sustainability and a unique sustainable level of inequality exists. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Becker (1980) showed that, if time preference is heterogeneous, the most patient 
household will eventually own all capital and substantial inequality will emerge. Hence, 
heterogeneity in preferences is an important subject for social welfare. The state Becker (1980) 
showed is Pareto efficient, but less patient households cannot achieve optimality. Consequently, 
even though the state is Pareto efficient, it may not be practically sustainable because the less 
patient households will try to escape from the non-optimality by various means—particularly 
political ones. Therefore, both efficiency and sustainability should be considered in the study of 
a heterogeneous population. The term “sustainability” is often used narrowly in reference to 
environmental problems, but here it is used in an economic sense. It contains a normative 
ingredient and therefore is closely related to welfare economics—particularly the social welfare 
function (e.g., Samuelson, 1947; Arrow, 1962; Sen, 1973). However, the relationship between 
sustainability and social welfare is little known because most studies on social welfare have not 
focused on heterogeneity in the process of economic growth. This paper directs its attention to 
heterogeneity in endogenous growth and studies social welfare in a heterogeneous population 
under the dual criteria of efficiency and sustainability. 
 The state described by Becker (1980) implies that substantial inequality is an 
inevitable consequence of pursuing efficiency in a heterogeneous population. In other words, 
inequality is positively correlated with economic growth. The correlation between inequality 
and growth has long been studied (e.g., Kuznets 1955). Some empirical studies have shown that 
inequality is negatively correlated with growth (e.g., Alesina und Rodrik, 1994; Persson und 
Tabellini, 1994; Clarke, 1995; Deininger and Squire, 1998), but some recent studies show 
positive correlations, particularly in industrialized economies (e.g., Forbes, 2000; Barro, 2000; 
Voitchovsky, 2005). In this paper, the correlation in a heterogeneous population is examined by 
considering sustainability in endogenous growth models. 
 This paper deals with three heterogeneities—those in time preference, risk aversion, 
and productivity—and examines their sustainability in endogenous growth models. These three 
parameters are essential elements for endogenous growth. Sustainable heterogeneity is defined 
as the state in which all heterogeneous households indefinitely maintain their optimality. The 
models indicate that a balanced growth path exists on which all heterogeneous households 
indefinitely hold optimality and heterogeneity is sustainable. However, a unilaterally balanced 
growth path also exists on which only the most advantaged household can achieve optimality. 
The unilateral path is not sustainable and will cause political conflicts through the resistance of 
less advantaged households. Although advantaged households can achieve optimality on either 
path, less advantaged households can achieve optimality only on the multilateral path. This 
characteristic dramatically changes the behavior of advantaged households, because conflict 
between households can end with all households commonly achieving optimality if advantaged 
households select the multilateral path. In this paper, path selection―whether multilateral or 
unilateral―is modeled by introducing a political loss function. If less advantaged households 
unite firmly and the authority utilizes various measures (e.g., progressive taxes, financial 
transfers, and affirmative action), the multilateral path can be secured.  
 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, multi-economy endogenous growth 
models with heterogeneous rates of time preference, degrees of risk aversion, and productivities 
are constructed. In Section 3, sustainability of heterogeneity is examined by using the models. 
The existence of a unique balanced growth path on which all optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are satisfied is shown, and heterogeneity on this path is sustainable. 
In Section 4, the unilaterally balanced growth path is examined on which only the most 
advantaged household can achieve optimality, and heterogeneity is not sustainable. In Section 5, 
the political mechanism of the path selection is examined. Section 6 shows the means to 
establish sustainable heterogeneity. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered in Section 7. 
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2.  THE MODEL 
 
2.1  The base model 
 In this paper, sustainability of heterogeneity is examined in the framework of 
endogenous growth, but most endogenous growth models commonly have problems with scale 
effects or the influence of population growth (e.g., Jones, 1995a, b). Hence, this paper uses the 
model presented by Harashima (2004), which is free from both problems (see also Jones, 1995a; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Peretto and Smulders, 2002). The production function is =tY  ( )ttt LKAF ,, , and the accumulation of capital is 
 
tttt AνCYK && −−=  ,                            (1) 
 
where Yt is outputs, At is technology, Kt is capital inputs, Lt is labor inputs, Ct is consumption, 
( )0>ν  is a constant, and a unit of Kt and 
ν
1  of a unit of At are equivalent: that is, they are 
produced using the same quantities of inputs. All firms are identical and have the same size, and 
for any period, 
 
t
t
L
Mm =  ,                               (2) 
 
where Mt is the number of firms, and ( )0>m  is a constant. In addition,  
 
( )ttttt νA
Y
MK
Y
∂
∂=∂
∂ ϖ  ;                          (3) 
 
thus,  
 
t
t
t
t
A
y
mνk
y
∂
∂=∂
∂ ϖ                               (4) 
 
is always kept, where yt is output per capita, kt is capital per capita, and ( )1>ϖ  is a constant. 
For simplicity, the period of patent is assumed to be indefinite, and no capital depreciation is 
assumed. ϖ  indicates the effect of patent protection. With patents, the income is distributed to 
not only capitals and labors but technologies. Equation (2) indicates that population and number 
of firms are positively correlated. Equations (3) and (4) indicate that returns on investing in Kt 
and in At are kept equal and that a firm that produces a new technology cannot obtain all the 
returns on an investment in At. This means that investing in At increases Yt, but the investing 
firm’s return on the investment in At is only a fraction of the increase of Yt, such that 
( ) ( )tttttt νA
Y
mLνA
Y
M ∂
∂=∂
∂ ϖϖ  because of uncompensated knowledge spillovers to other firms and 
complementarity of technologies. 
 A part of the knowledge generated as a result of an investment made by a firm spills 
over to other firms. Researchers in firms as well as universities and research institutions could 
not effectively generate innovations if they were isolated from other researchers. They contact 
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and stimulate each other. Probably, mutual partial knowledge spillovers among researchers and 
firms give each other reciprocal benefits. Researchers take hints on their researches in exchange 
for spilled knowledge. Therefore, even though the investing firm wishes to keep its knowledge 
secret, some parts of it will spill over. In addition, many uncompensated knowledge spillovers 
occur because many technologies are regarded as so minor that they are not applied for patents 
and left unprotected by patents. Nevertheless, even if a technology that was generated as a 
byproduct is completely useless for the investing firm, it may be a treasure for firms in a 
different industry. At includes all these technologies, and an investment in technology generates 
many technologies that the investing firm cannot protect by patents.  
 Broadly speaking, there are two types of uncompensated knowledge spillovers: 
intra-sectoral knowledge spillovers (i.e., Marshall-Arrow-Romer [MAR] externalities; Marshall, 
1890; Arrow, 1962; Romer, 1986) and inter-sectoral knowledge spillovers (i.e., Jacobs 
externalities; Jacobs, 1969). MAR theory assumes that knowledge spillovers between 
homogenous firms work out most effectively and that spillovers will therefore primarily emerge 
within one sector. As a result, uncompensated knowledge spillovers will be more active if the 
number of firms within a sector is larger. On the other hand, Jacobs (1969) argues that 
knowledge spillovers are most effective among firms that practice different activities and that 
diversification (i.e., a variety of sectors) is important for spillovers. As a result, uncompensated 
knowledge spillovers will be more active if the number of sectors in the economy is larger. 
Nevertheless, if all sectors have the same number of firms, an increase in the number of firms in 
the economy results in more active knowledge spillovers in any case, owing to either MAR 
externalities or Jacobs externalities. 
 Furthermore, as the volume of uncompensated knowledge spillovers increases, the 
investing firm’s returns on the investment in At decrease. 
t
t
A
Y
∂
∂  indicates the total increase in Yt 
in the economy by an increase in At, which consists of increases in both outputs in the firm that 
invested in the new technologies and outputs in other firms that utilize the newly invented 
technologies, whether the firms obtained the technologies by compensating the originating firm 
or by using uncompensated knowledge spillovers. If the number of firms becomes larger and 
uncompensated knowledge spillovers occur more actively, the compensated fraction in 
t
t
A
Y
∂
∂  
that the investing firm can obtain becomes smaller, and the investing firm’s returns on the 
investment in At also become smaller. 
 Complementarity of technologies also reduces the fraction of 
t
t
A
Y
∂
∂  that the investing 
firm can obtain. If a new technology is effective only if it is combined with some particular 
technologies, the return on the investment in technology will belong not only to the investing 
firm but to the firms that hold these particular technologies. For example, an innovation in 
software technology generated by a software company increases the sales and profits of 
computer hardware companies. The economy’s productivity increases because of the innovation 
but the increased incomes are attributed not only to the firm that generated the innovation but 
also to the firms that hold complementary technologies. A part of 
t
t
A
Y
∂
∂  leaks to these firms. For 
them, the leaked income is a kind of rent revenue unexpectedly become obtainable thanks to the 
innovation. Most new technologies will have complementary technologies. In addition, as the 
number of firms increases, the number of firms that holds complementary technologies will also 
increase, and thereby these leaks will also increase.  
 Because of the uncompensated knowledge spillovers and the complementarity of 
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technologies, therefore, the fraction of 
t
t
A
Y
∂
∂  that an investing firm can obtain on average will 
be comparatively small, i.e., ϖ  will be far smaller than Mt except that Mt is very small,1 and 
the fraction will decrease as Mt increases.  
 The production function is specified as ( )ttαtt ,LKfAY =  where α ( )10 << α  is a 
constant. Let 
t
t
t L
Yy = , 
t
t
t L
Kk = , 
t
t
t L
Cc = , and 
t
t
t L
Ln
&= , and assume that ( )tt LKf ,  is 
homogenous of degree one. Thus ( )tαtt kfAy =  and tt
t
t
ttt knL
Aν
cyk −−−=
&& . By equation (4), 
( )
( )t
t
t kfmν
kαfA ′=
ϖ  because ( ) ( )tαttαt
t
t
t
t kfAkfA
mν
α
k
y
Amν
y ′=⇔∂
∂=∂
∂ −1ϖϖ . 
 
2.2  Models with heterogeneous households 
 Three heterogeneities―heterogeneous time preference, risk aversion, and 
productivity―are examined in endogenous growth models, which are modified versions of the 
model shown in Section 2.1. First, suppose that there are two economies― economy 1 and 
economy 2—that are identical except for time preference, risk aversion, or productivity. The 
population growth rate is zero (i.e., 0=tn ). The economies are fully open to each other, and 
goods, services, and capital are freely transacted between them, but labor is immobilized in each 
economy. 
 Each economy can be interpreted as representing either a country (the international 
interpretation) or a group of identical households in a country (the national interpretation). 
Because the economies are fully open, they are integrated through trade and form a combined 
economy. The combined economy is the world economy in the international interpretation and 
the national economy in the national interpretation. In the following discussion, a model based 
on the international interpretation is called an international model and that based on the national 
interpretation is called a national model. Usually, the concept of the balance of payments is used 
only for the international transactions. However, because both national and international 
interpretations are possible, this concept and terminology are also used for the national models 
in this paper. 
 
2.2.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
 First, a model in which the two economies are identical except for time preference is 
constructed.2 The rate of time preference of the representative household in economy 1 is 1θ  
and that in economy 2 is 2θ , and 21 θθ < . The production function in economy 1 is ( )tαtt kfAy ,1,1 =  and that in economy 2 is ( )tαtt kfAy ,2,2 = , where yi,t and ki,t are, respectively, 
output and capital per capita in economy i in period t for i = 1, 2. The population of each 
                                                          
1 If Mt is very small, the value of ϖ  will be far smaller than that for sufficiently large Mt, because the number of 
firms that can benefit from an innovation is constrained owing to very small Mt. The very small number of firms 
indicates that the economy is not sufficiently sophisticated, and thereby the benefit of an innovation can not be fully 
realized in the economy. This constraint can be modeled as =ϖ  ( )[ ]tM1~11~ −−− ϖϖ  where ( )1~ ≥ϖ  is a constant. 
Nevertheless, for sufficiently large Mt (i.e., in sufficiently sophisticated economies), the constraint is removed such 
that ( )[ ] ϖϖϖϖ ==−− −∞→ ~~11~lim 1 tt MM . 
2 This type of endogenous growth model of heterogeneous time preference was originally shown by Harashima 
(2009c). 
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economy is 
2
tL ; thus, the total for both is Lt, which is sufficiently large. Firms operate in both 
economies, and the number of firms is Mt. The current account balance in economy 1 is tτ  and 
that in economy 2 is tτ− . Because a balanced growth path requires Harrod neutral 
technological progress, the production functions are further specified as  
 
 αti,
α
ti,t kAy
−= 1  ; 
 
thus, ( ) ( )2,11,, == − iLAKY αttαtiti . 
 Because both economies are fully open, returns on investments in each economy are 
kept equal through arbitration such that  
 
=∂
∂
,t
,t
k
y
1
1 ( )
,t
,t
t
,t,t
k
y
A
yy
mν 2
221
2 ∂
∂=∂
+∂ϖ .                     (5) 
 
Equation (5) indicates that an increase in At enhances outputs in both economies such that ( )
( )t
,t,t
ti,t
i,t
νA
YY
MK
Y
∂
+∂=∂
∂ 21ϖ , and because the population is equal (
2
tL ), =∂
∂=∂
∂
i,t
i,t
i,t
i,t
k
y
K
Y  
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
t
,t,tt
t
,t,t
tt
,t,t
t A
yy
mv
L
νA
yy
mLνA
YY
M ∂
+∂=∂
+∂=∂
+∂ 212121
22
ϖϖϖ . Therefore, 
 
 ( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )t ttt ttt kfmν
kfkfα
kfmν
kfkfα
A
,2
,2,1
,1
,2,1
22 ′
+=′
+= ϖϖ  . 
 
Because equation (5) is always held through arbitration, equations tt kk ,2,1 = , tt kk ,2,1 && = , 
tt yy ,2,1 =  and tt yy ,2,1 && =  are also held. Hence, 
 
 ( )( ) ( )( )ttttt kfmν
kαf
kfmν
kαf
A
,2
,2
,1
,1
′=′=
ϖϖ  . 
 
In addition, because ( ) ( )
t
,t,t
t
,t,t
A
yy
A
yy
,2
21
,1
21
∂
+∂=∂
+∂  through arbitration, then tt AA ,2,1 && =  is 
held. 
 The accumulated current account balance dsτ
t
s∫0  mirrors capital flows between the 
two economies. The economy with current account surpluses invests them in the other economy. 
Since ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂=∂
∂
t
t
t
t
k
y
k
y
,2
,2
,1
,1  are returns on investments, dsτ
k
y t
s
t
t ∫∂∂ 0,1,1  and dsτk
y t
s
t
t ∫∂∂ 0,2,2  represent 
income receipts or payments on the assets that an economy owns in the other economy. Hence,  
 
dsτ
k
y
τ
t
s
t
t
t ∫∂∂− 0,2,2  
 
is the balance on goods and services of economy 1, and  
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t
t
s
t
t τdsτ
k
y −∂
∂ ∫0
,1
,1  
 
is that of economy 2. Because the current account balance mirrors capital flows between the 
economies, the balance is a function of capital in both economies such that  
 
 ( ),t,tt ,kkgτ 21=  . 
 
 The representative household in economy 1 maximizes its expected utility 
 
 ( ) ( )dttθcuE t 10 ,11 exp −∫ ∞  , 
 
subject to 
 
1
,1,10
,2
,2
,1,1 2
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−−∂
∂+= ∫ ttttt s
t
t
tt
LAνcτdsτ
k
y
yk &&  ,            (6) 
 
and the representative household in economy 2 maximizes its expected utility 
 
 ( ) ( )dttθcuE t 20 ,22 exp −∫ ∞  , 
 
subject to 
 
1
,2,20
,1
,1
,2,2 2
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−+∂
∂−= ∫ ttttt s
t
t
tt
LAνcτdsτ
k
y
yk &&  ,             (7) 
 
where ui,t, ci,t, and tiA ,& , respectively, are the utility function, per capita consumption, and the 
increase in At by R&D activities in economy i in period t for i = 1, 2; E is the expectation 
operator; and ttt AAA ,2,1 &&& += . Equations (6) and (7) implicitly assume that each economy 
does not have foreign assets or debt in period t = 0. 
 Because the production function is Harrod neutral and because ( )( )ttt kfmν
kfα
A
,1
,1
′=
ϖ  
( )( )ttkfmν
kfα
,2
,2
′=
ϖ  and αi,tkf −= 1 , then 
 
( ) ti,t kαmν
αA −= 1
ϖ  
 
and 
 
  ( ) αα
ti,
ti, α
mν
α
k
y −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=∂
∂ 11ϖ  . 
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Since ,t,t AA 21 && =  and 
,t
,t
,t
,t
k
y
k
y
2
2
1
1
∂
∂=∂
∂ , then 
 
      
1
10
,1
,1
11 22
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−−∂
∂+= ∫ tt,ttt s
t
t
,t,t
LAνcτdsτ
k
y
yk
&&  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ,tt,tt
t
s
α
α
t
α
α
k
αmL
αcτdsτα
mν
αkα
mv
α
110
1
,1 1
11 &−−−−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫−− ϖϖϖ  
 
and 
 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+−
−= ∫−− ,ttt sα
α
,t
α
α
t
t
,t cτdsταmν
αkα
mν
α
ααmL
αmLk 10
1
11 111
1 ϖϖ
ϖ
&  . 
 
Because tL  is sufficiently large and ϖ  is far smaller than Mt, the problem of scale effects 
vanishes and thereby ( )( ) 11
1 =+−
−
ααmL
αmL
t
t
ϖ .  
 Putting the above elements together, the optimization problem of economy 1 can be 
rewritten as  
 
 ( ) ( )dttθcuEMax ,t 10 11 exp −∫ ∞  , 
 
subject to 
 
 ( ) ( ) ,ttt sα
α
,t
α
α
,t cτdsταmν
αkα
mν
αk 10
1
11 11 −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫−− ϖϖ&  . 
 
Similarly, that of economy 2 can be rewritten as 
 
 ( ) ( )dttθcuEMax ,t 20 22 exp −∫ ∞  , 
 
subject to 
 
 ( ) ( ) ,ttt sα
α
,t
α
α
,t cτdsταmν
αkα
mν
αk 20
1
22 11 −+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫−− ϖϖ&  . 
 
2.2.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
 The basic structure of the model with heterogeneous risk aversion is the same as that 
of heterogeneous time preference. The two economies are identical except in regard to risk 
aversion.3 The degree of relative risk aversion of economy 1 is 
'u
"uc
ε ,t
1
11
1 −=  and that of 
                                                          
3 This type of endogenous growth model of heterogeneous risk aversion was originally shown by Harashima 
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economy 2 is 
'u
"uc
ε ,t
2
22
2 −= , which are constant, and 21 εε < . The optimization problem of 
economy 1 is 
 
 ( ) ( )dtθtcuEMax ,t −∫ ∞ exp0 11  , 
 
subject to 
 
 ( ) ( ) ,ttt sα
α
,t
α
α
,t cτdsταmν
αkα
mν
αk 10
1
11 11 −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫−− ϖϖ&  , 
 
and that of economy 2 is 
 
 ( ) ( )dtθtcuEMax ,t −∫ ∞ exp0 22  , 
 
subject to 
 
 ( ) ( ) ,ttt sα
α
,t
α
α
,t cτdsταmν
αkα
mν
αk 20
1
22 11 −+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫−− ϖϖ&  . 
 
2.2.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
 With heterogeneous productivity, the production function is heterogeneous, not the 
utility function. Because technology At is common to both economies, a heterogeneous 
production function requires heterogeneity in elements other than technology. Prescott (1998) 
argues that unknown factors other than technology have made total factor productivity (TFP) 
heterogeneous across countries. Harashima (2009a) argues that average workers’ innovative 
activities are an essential element of productivity and make TFP heterogeneous across workers, 
firms, and economies. Since average workers are human and capable of creative intellectual 
activities, they can create innovations even if their innovations are minor. It is rational for firms 
to exploit all the opportunities that these ordinary workers’ innovative activities offer. 
Furthermore, innovations created by ordinary workers are indispensable for efficient production. 
A production function incorporating average workers’ innovations has been shown to have a 
Cobb-Douglas functional form with a labor share of about 70% (Harashima 2009a), such that 
 
α
t
α
t
α
tLAt LKAωωσY
−= 1  ,                         (8) 
 
where ωA and ωL are positive constant parameters with regard to average workers’ creative 
activities, and σ  is a parameter that represents a worker’s accessibility limit to capital with 
regard to location. The parameters ωA and ωL are independent of At but are dependent on the 
creative activities of average workers. Thereby, unlike with technology At, these parameters can 
be heterogeneous across workers, firms, and economies. 
 In this model of heterogeneous productivity, it is assumed that workers whose 
households belong to different economies have different values of ωA and ωL. In addition, only 
productivity that is represented by αtLA Aωωσ  in equation (8) is heterogeneous between the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(2009d). 
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two economies. The production function of economy 1 is ( ),tαtα,t kfAωy 111 =  and that of 
economy 2 is ( ),tαtα,t kfAωy 222 = , where ( )10 11 ≤< ωω  and ( )10 22 ≤< ωω  are constants and 
12 ωω < . Since ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )t ,t,tttt ,t,ttt ,t,ttti, ti,ti,ti, A
yy
mL
L
νA
yy
mLνA
YY
M
k
y
K
Y
∂
+∂=∂
+∂=∂
+∂=∂
∂=∂
∂ − 2121211
22
ϖϖ   by 
equation (5), then 
 ( ) ( )[ ]
( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( ),tα
,t
α
,t
α
,t
α
,t
α
,t
α
t kfωm ν
kfωkfωα
kfωm ν
kfωkfωα
A
22
2211
11
2211
22 ′
+=′
+= ϖϖ  .        (9) 
 
Because equation (5) is always held through arbitration, equations tt kω
ωk ,2
2
1
,1 = , tt kω
ωk ,2
2
1
,1
&& = , 
tt yω
ωy ,2
2
1
,1 = , and tt yω
ωy ,2
2
1
,1 && =  are also held. In addition, since ( ) ( )
t
,t,t
t
,t,t
A
yy
A
yy
,2
21
,1
21
∂
+∂=∂
+∂   
by arbitration, tt Aω
ωA ,2
2
1
,1
&& =  is held. Because of equation (9) and αti,αi kωf −= 1 , then =tA  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )22211121212111 1212 kωkkωωαmν
αkkωkω
ωαmν
α αααα
α
αααα
α +−=+−
−− ϖϖ , 
α
αααα
α
αααα
ω
kωkkω
ω
kkωkω
2
222
1
11
1
1
21211 +=+
−−
, 
and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ααααααααααααααα
ti
ti kkωkkωα
mν
αkkkωkωα
mν
α
k
y −−−−−− +−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=∂
∂
2222
1
11
1
1
1
21211
1
,
, 1
2
1
2
ϖϖ α . Since 
tt kkω
ω
,2,1
1
2 = , then ( )2111
1
1
1
1
1
2
1211
1
1
21211 1 ωωk
ω
k
ω
ωkωkω
ω
kkωkω
α
α
α
ααα
α
αααα
−
−
−
−
+=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+
=+  and 
( ) ( )121221111
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
21
1
21
11
2
222
1
11 11 −−
−
−
+=+=+=
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=+ ωωkωωkk
ω
ωk
ω
k
ω
ω
ωk
ω
ωkω
ω
kωkkω
α
αα
α
αα
α
αααα
. Hence, 
 
 =tA ( )( ) ( )( )αm ν ωωαkαm ν ωωαk −+=−+
−−
12
1
12
1 121
2
2
1
1
1
ϖϖ  , 
 
and 
 
( ) ααα
ti,
ti, α
mν
αωω
k
y −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +=∂
∂ 121 1
2
ϖ  
 
for i = 1, 2. Because t
α
t Aω
ωA ,2
1
1
2
,1
&&
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=  (i.e., ( ) t,t,t,t AωωAAA 121121 1 &&&& −+=+= ) and 
,t
,t
,t
,t
k
y
k
y
2
2
1
1
∂
∂=∂
∂ , then   
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1
110
1
1
11 2
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−−∂
∂+= ∫ t,t,ttt s
,t
,t
,t,t
LAνcτdsτ
k
y
yk &&  
     ( ) 1121110
1
1
1 2
1
−
−− ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−−−∂
∂+= ∫ tt,ttt s
,t
,t
,t
L
ωωAνcτdsτ
k
y
y &  
     ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,tt,tt
t
s
α
α
,t
α
α k
αmL
αcτdsτα
mν
αωωk
αmv
αωω
ω 110
121
1
2
1
1
1 1
1
212
1 &
−−−−−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
+= ∫−− ϖϖϖ  , 
 
and 
 
 ( )( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ −−−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
+
+−
−= ∫− ttt sα
α
t
α
t
t
t cτdsταmν
αωωk
αmv
αωω
ααmL
αmLk ,10
121
,1
21
,1 12121
1 ϖϖ
ϖ
&  . 
 
 Because Lt is sufficiently large and ϖ  is far smaller than Mt and thus ( )
( ) 11
1 =+−
−
ααmL
αmL
t
t
ϖ , the optimization problem of economy 1 is 
 
 ( ) ( )dtθtcuEMax ,t −∫ ∞ exp0 11  , 
 
subject to 
 
 ( )( )
( ) ( ) ttt sα
α
t
α
t cτdsταmν
αωωk
αmv
αωωk ,10
121
,1
21
,1 1212
−−−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
+= ∫−ϖϖ&  , 
 
and similarly, that of economy 2 is 
 
 ( ) ( )dtθtcuEMax ,t −∫ ∞ exp0 22  , 
 
subject to 
 
 ( )( )
( ) ( ) ,ttt sα
α
,t
α
,t cτdsταmν
αωωk
αmv
αωωk 20
121
2
21
2 1212
−+−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
+= ∫−ϖϖ&  . 
 
 
3.  SUSTAINABILITY OF HETEROGENEITY 
 
 Heterogeneity is defined as being sustainable if all the optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are satisfied indefinitely. Although the previously discussed state of 
Becker (1980) is Pareto efficient, by this definition, the heterogeneity is not sustainable because 
only the most patient household can achieve optimality. Sustainability is therefore the stricter 
criterion for welfare than Pareto efficiency. 
 In this section, the growth path that makes heterogeneity sustainable is examined. First, 
the basic natures of the models presented in Section 2 are examined and then sustainability is 
examined. 
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3.1  The consumption growth rate 
3.1.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
 Let Hamiltonian H1 be 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−= ∫−− ,ttt sα
α
,t
α
α
,t,t cτdsταmν
αkα
mν
α
λtθcuH 10
1
111111 11exp
ϖϖ  , 
 
where tλ1  is a costate variable. The optimality conditions for economy 1 are 
 ( ) ( ) ,t
,t
,t λtθ
c
cu
11
1
11 exp =−∂
∂  ,                     (10) 
,t
,t k
H
λ
1
1
1 ∂
∂−=&  ,                           (11) 
( ) ( ) ,ttt sα
α
,t
α
α
,t cτdsταmν
αkα
mν
αk 10
1
11 11 −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫−− ϖϖ&  , and         (12) 
0lim 11 =∞→ ,t,tt kλ  .                          (13) 
 
Similarly, let Hamiltonian H2 be 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ −+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−= ∫−− ,ttt sα
α
,t
α
α
,t,t cτdsταmν
αkα
mν
α
λtθcuH 20
1
221222 11exp
ϖϖ , 
 
where tλ 2  is a costate variable. The optimality conditions for economy 2 are 
 ( ) ( ) ,t
,t
,t λtθ
c
cu
21
2
22 exp =−∂
∂  ,                      (14) 
,t
,t k
H
λ
2
2
2 ∂
∂−=&  ,                             (15) 
( ) ( ) ,ttt sα
α
,t
α
α
,t cτdsταmν
αkα
mν
αk 20
1
22 11 −+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫−− ϖϖ& , and       (16) 
0lim 22 =∞→ ,t,tt kλ  .                          (17) 
 
By equations (10), (11), and (12), the consumption growth rate in economy 1 is 
 
( ) ( )
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−∂
∂−∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫−−− 1
11
011
1
1 11 θ
k
τ
k
dsτ
α
mν
α
α
mν
α
ε
c
c
,t
t
,t
t
s
α
α
α
α
,t
,t ϖϖ&  ,       (18) 
 
and by equations (14), (15), and (16), that in economy 2 is 
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( ) ( )
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−∂
∂+∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫−−− 2
22
011
2
2 11 θ
k
τ
k
dsτ
α
mν
α
α
mν
α
ε
c
c
,t
t
,t
t
s
α
α
α
α
,t
,t ϖϖ&  ,      (19) 
 
where 
'u
"uc
'u
"uc
ε ,t,t
2
22
1
11 −=−=  is the degree of relative risk aversion, which is constant. A 
constant growth rate such that 
t
t
t
t
c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 && =  is possible if 
 
( ) 21
212
0
1
011 θθ
k
τ
k
τ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
α
mν
α
,t
t
,t
t
,t
t
s
,t
t
s
α
α
−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
+∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∫∫−ϖ         (20) 
 
is satisfied.  
 
3.1.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
 By using similar procedures as were used with the heterogeneous time preference 
model, the consumption growth rate in economy 1 in this model is 
 
( ) ( )
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−∂
∂−∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫−−− θ
k
τ
k
dsτ
α
mν
α
α
mν
α
ε
c
c
,t
t
,t
t
s
α
α
α
α
,t
,t
11
011
1
1
1 11 ϖϖ&  ,    (21) 
 
and that in economy 2 is 
 
( ) ( )
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−∂
∂+∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫−−− θ
k
τ
k
dsτ
α
mν
α
α
mν
α
ε
c
c
,t
t
,t
t
s
α
α
α
α
,t
,t
22
011
2
2
2 11 ϖϖ&  .    (22) 
 
A constant growth rate such that 
t
t
t
t
c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 && =  is possible if 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
+∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −− ∫∫ θα
mν
α
εε
k
dsτ
ε
k
dsτ
εα
mν
α α
α
,t
t
s
,t
t
s
α
α
11 12
2
0
1
1
0
2
1 ϖϖ  
,t
t
,t
t
k
τ
ε
k
τ
ε
2
1
1
2 ∂
∂+∂
∂=                                                     (23) 
 
is satisfied.  
 
3.1.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
 By similar procedures, the consumption growth rate in economy 1 in this model is 
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( )
( )
( ) ( )
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−∂
∂−∂
∂
−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
+= ∫−− θ
k
τ
k
dsτ
α
mν
αωω
αmv
αωω
ε
c
c
,t
t
,t
t
sα
αα
t
t
11
0121211
,1
,1 1
212
ϖϖ&  ,     (24) 
 
and that in economy 2 is 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−∂
∂+∂
∂
−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
+= ∫−− θ
k
τ
k
dsτ
α
mν
αωω
αmv
αωω
ε
c
c
t
t
t
t
sα
αα
t
t
,2,2
0121211
,2
,2 1
212
ϖϖ&  .    (25) 
 
A constant growth rate such that 
t
t
t
t
c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 && =  is possible if 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ,t
t
t
t
t
t
s
,t
t
s
α
k
τ
k
τ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
α
αmν
αωω
2,1,2
0
1
021 1
12 ∂
∂+∂
∂=
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∂
∂
+∂
∂
−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
+ ∫∫ϖ            (26) 
 
is satisfied.  
 
3.2  Transversality conditions 
3.2.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
 Transversality conditions are satisfied if the following conditions are satisfied. 
 
Lemma 1-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, unless 1lim
,1
,1 −<∞→
t
t
t λ
λ& , 
1lim
,2
,2 −<∞→
t
t
t λ
λ& , 1lim
,1
,1 −<∞→
t
t
t k
k& , or 1lim
,2
,2 −<∞→
t
t
t k
k& , the transversality conditions (equations [13] 
and [17]) are satisfied if 
 
( ) 01lim
,1
,1
,1
0
,1
01
,1,1
<
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −∂
∂ ∫∫−
∞→
t
t
t
t
s
t
t
s
α
α
t
t
t
t
t k
c
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
α
mν
α
k
τ
k
τ ϖ        (27) 
 
and 
 
( ) 01lim
,2
,2
,2
0
,2
01
,2,2
<
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂− ∫∫−∞→
t
t
t
t
s
t
t
sα
α
t
t
t
t
t k
c
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
α
mν
α
k
τ
k
τ ϖ  .     (28) 
 
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
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3.2.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
 
Lemma 1-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, unless 1lim
,1
,1 −<∞→
t
t
t λ
λ& , 
1lim
,2
,2 −<∞→
t
t
t λ
λ& , 1lim
,1
,1 −<∞→
t
t
t k
k& , or 1lim
,2
,2 −<∞→
t
t
t k
k& , the transversality conditions are satisfied if 
 
( ) 01lim
1
1
111
0
1
0 <
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
⎟⎠
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−−⎟⎠
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⎛ ∫∫−
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,t
,t
,t
t
,t
t
,t
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s
,t
t
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α
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c
k
τ
k
τ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
α
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αϖ  
 
and  
 
( ) 01lim
2
2
222
0
2
0 <
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛− ∫∫−∞→
,t
,t
,t
t
,t
t
,t
t
s
,t
t
sα
α
t k
c
k
τ
k
τ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
α
mν
αϖ . 
 
3.2.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
 
Lemma 1-3: In the model of heterogeneous productivity, unless 1lim
,1
,1 −<∞→
t
t
t λ
λ& , 1lim
,2
,2 −<∞→
t
t
t λ
λ& , 
1lim
,1
,1 −<
∞→
t
t
t k
k& , or 1lim
,2
,2 −<
∞→
t
t
t k
k& , the transversality conditions are satisfied if 
 
( ) ( ) 01
2
lim
1
1
111
0
1
0121 <
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−−
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∂
∂
−−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ + ∫∫−
∞→
,t
,t
,t
t
,t
t
,t
t
s
,t
t
sα
α
t k
c
k
τ
k
τ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
α
mν
αωω ϖ  
 
and  
 
( ) ( ) 01
2
lim
2
2
222
0
2
0121 <
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−−
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∂
∂
−−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +− ∫∫−∞→
,t
,t
,t
t
,t
t
,t
t
s
,t
t
sα
α
t k
c
k
τ
k
τ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
α
mν
αωω ϖ  . 
 
 In all three models, the occurrence of 1lim
,1
,1 −<∞→
t
t
t λ
λ& , 1lim
,2
,2 −<∞→
t
t
t λ
λ& , 1lim
,1
,1 −<∞→
t
t
t k
k& , 
or 1lim
,2
,2 −<∞→
t
t
t k
k&  is extremely unusual, and these cases are excluded in the following 
discussion. 
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3.3  Sustainability 
 Because balanced growth is the focal point for the growth path analysis, the following 
analyses focus on the steady state such that 
t
t
t c
c
,1
,1lim
&
∞→
, 
t
t
t c
c
,2
,2lim
&
∞→
, 
t
t
t k
k
,1
,1lim
&
∞→
, 
t
t
t k
k
,2
,2lim
&
∞→
, and 
t
t
t τ
τ&
∞→lim
 are constants. 
 
3.3.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
 The balanced growth path in the heterogeneous time preference model has the 
following properties. 
 
Lemma 2-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&&  
constant, then 
 
 
∫
∫ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛
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t
s
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t
t
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k
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c
c
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τ
τ
τ
τ&&&&&  . 
 
Proof: See Appendix 2. 
 
Proposition 1-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if and only if 
t
t
t c
c
,1
,1lim
&
∞→
 
== ∞→
t
t
t c
c
,2
,2lim
& constant, all the optimality conditions of both economies are satisfied at steady state. 
Proof: By Lemma 2-1, if == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
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c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant, 
 
 Ξ
k
τ
k
τ
t
t
t
t
t
t
== ∞→∞→
,2,1
limlim  , 
 
where Ξ is a constant. In addition, because 
t
t
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s
t
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s
t
s
t c
c
dsds
dt
dsd
,1
,1
00
0
limlimlim
&
∞→∞→∞→ ==
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∫∫
∫
τ
τ
τ
τ
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1
,1
,1
,2
0
,1
0 limlimlim
−
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⎞
⎜⎜⎝
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t
t
t
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t
t
t
s
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Ξ
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k
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Thus, 
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t
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t
t
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t
t
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t
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τ
k
τ
k
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k
τ
2211
limlimlimlim ∂
∂==∂
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∂
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t
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1
0
1
0 limlim  
 16
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0
2
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t
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t
s
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t
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α
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c
k
c
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τ
k
τ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
α
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Hence, by Lemma 1-1, the transversality conditions are satisfied while all the other optimality 
conditions are also satisfied. 
 On the other hand, if 
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t c
c
c
c
2
2
1
1 limlim
&&
∞→∞→ ≠ , then ∫
∫ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛
≠ ∞→∞→ t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t ds
dt
dsd
0
0
limlim τ
τ
τ
τ& . Thus, by 
Lemma 1-1, for both economies to satisfy the transverality conditions, it is necessary that 
∞=∞→
,t
,t
t k
c
1
1lim  or ∞=∞→
,t
,t
t k
c
2
2lim
& , which violates equation (12) or (16).                   ■ 
 
 The path on which == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant has the following properties. 
 
Corollary 1-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if and only if =∞→
t
t
t c
c
,1
,1lim
&  
=∞→
t
t
t c
c
,2
,2lim
& constant, then 
 
======= ∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→
t
t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
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t
,t
,t
t
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t
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A
y
y
y
y
k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c &&&&&&&
limlimlimlimlimlimlim
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1 constant. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 3. 
 
 Note that the limit of the growth rate on this path is 
 
( )
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛== −−∞→∞→ 21limlim
211
2
2
1
1 θθα
mν
α
ε
c
c
c
c α
α
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
ϖ&&                (29) 
 
by equations (18) and (19). 
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Corollary 2-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if and only if =∞→
t
t
t c
c
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,1lim
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=
∞→
t
t
t c
c
,2
,2lim
& constant, 
 
t
t
t
t
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t
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s
t
s
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t
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c
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τ
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0
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&&&&&
∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→ ===== ∫
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           ==== ∞→∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t A
A
y
y
y
y &&&
limlimlim
,2
,2
,1
,1 constant.                            (30) 
 
Proof: By Lemma 2-1, 
ds
dt
dsd
c
c
c
c
t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t ∫
∫
∞→∞→∞→∞→ ===
0
0
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlimlimlim
τ
τ
τ
τ&&& . Therefore, by 
Corollary 1-1, equation (30) holds.                                              ■ 
 
Because current account imbalances eventually grow at the same rate as output, consumption, 
and capital on the multilateral path, the ratios of the current account balance to output, 
consumption, and capital do not explode, but they stabilize as shown in the proof of Proposition 
1-1; that is, Ξ
k
τ
k
τ
t
t
t
t
t
t
== ∞→∞→
,2,1
limlim . 
 On the balanced growth path satisfying Proposition 1-1 and Corollaries 1-1 and 2-1, 
heterogeneity in time preference is sustainable by definition because all the optimality 
conditions of the two economies are indefinitely satisfied. The balanced growth path satisfying 
Proposition 1-1 and Corollaries 1-1 and 2-1 is called the “multilateral balanced growth path” or 
(more briefly) the “multilateral path” in the following discussion. The term “multilateral” is 
used even though there are only two economies, because the two-economy models shown can 
easily be extended to the multi-economy models shown in Section 3.6.  
 Because technology will not decrease persistently (i.e., 0lim >∞→
t
t
t A
A& ), only the case 
such that 0lim >∞→
t
t
t A
A&  (i.e., 0limlim
,2
,2
,1
,1 >= ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c &&  on the multilateral path by Corollary 1-1) 
is examined in the following discussion. 
 
3.3.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
 On the multilateral path in the heterogeneous risk aversion model, the same 
Proposition, Lemmas, and Corollaries are proved by arguments similar to those shown in 
Section 3.3.1. 
 
Lemma 2-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&&  constant, 
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∫
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Proposition 1-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if and only if =∞→
t
t
t c
c
,1
,1lim
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=∞→
t
t
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c
,2
,2lim
& constant, all the optimality conditions of both economies are satisfied at steady state. 
 
Corollary 1-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if and only if =∞→
t
t
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Corollary 2-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if and only if =∞→
t
t
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c
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,2lim
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On the balanced growth path satisfying Proposition 1-2 and Corollaries 1-2 and 2-2, 
heterogeneity in risk aversion is also sustainable by definition because all the optimality 
conditions of the two economies are indefinitely satisfied, and this path is the multilateral path. 
 
3.3.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
 Similar Proposition, Lemmas, and Corollaries also hold in the heterogeneous 
productivity model. However, unlike heterogeneous preferences, 0lim =∞→ tt τ  and 0lim 0 =∫∞→ dsτt st  
are possible even if 
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&&
∞→∞→ =  as equations (24) and (25) indicate. Therefore, the 
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case of 0lim =∞→ tt τ  and 0lim 0 =∫∞→ dsτt st  will be dealt with separately from the case of 0lim ≠∞→ tt τ  
and 0lim
0
≠∫∞→ dsτt st  if necessary. 
 
Lemma 2-3: In the model of heterogeneous productivity, if 0lim =
∞→ tt
τ  and 
0lim
0
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 By Lemma 2-3, if all the optimality conditions of both economies are satisfied, either  
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Proposition 1-3: If and only if == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant, all the optimality conditions of 
both economies are satisfied at steady state. 
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Corollary 1-3: In the model of heterogeneous productivity, if and only if =∞→
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Corollary 2-3: In the model of heterogeneous productivity, if 0lim ≠∞→ tt τ  and 0lim 0 ≠∫∞→ dsτt st , 
then if and only if == ∞→∞→
t
t
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and  
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On the two balanced growth paths satisfying Proposition 1-3 and Corollaries 1-3 and 2-3, 
heterogeneity in productivity is sustainable by definition because all the optimality conditions of 
the two economies are indefinitely satisfied. 
 By equations (24) and (25), the limit of the growth rate on these sustainable paths is 
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3.4  The balance of payments 
3.4.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
 As shown in the proof of Proposition 1-1, Ξ
k
τ
k
τ
t
t
t
t
t
t
== ∞→∞→
,2,1
limlim  and 
t
t
s
t k
ds
,1
0lim
∫
∞→
τ
 
1
,1
,1
,2
0 limlim
−
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⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛== ∫
t
t
t
t
t
s
t c
c
Ξ
k
ds &τ  on the multilateral path. Because ki,t is positive, if the sign of Ξ 
is negative, the current account of economy 1 will eventually show permanent deficits and vice 
versa. 
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Lemma 3-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, 
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Proof: See Appendix 4. 
 
Lemma 3-1 indicates that the value of Ξ is uniquely determined on the multilateral path, and the 
sign of Ξ is also therefore uniquely determined. 
 
Proposition 2-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, 0<Ξ  if 
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by equations (18) and (19). Here, ( ) =
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
∂−∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∫−
∞→
,t
t
,t
t
s
α
α
t k
τ
k
dsτ
α
m ν
α
11
011lim ϖ  
( ) ( ) 011limlim1 1
1
1
1
1
1
11 <⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−
∞→
−
∞→
− α
α
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
α
α
α
mν
α
c
c
ΞΞ
c
c
Ξα
mν
α ϖϖ && . Since the limit 
of the growth rate is ( )
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= −−∞→ 21lim
211
1
1 θθα
mν
α
ε
c
c α
α
,t
,t
t
ϖ& , ( ) 11lim 1
1
1
1 −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−
∞→
α
α
,t
,t
t
α
mν
α
c
c ϖ&  
( )
( )
1
2
1
1
21
1
−+−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
=
−
−
θθ
α
mν
α
α
mν
α
ε
α
α
α
α
ϖ
ϖ
. Therefore, if ( ) ( )[ ]
2
111 21 θθαεα
mν
α α
α +<−−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −ϖ  , then 
( ) 11lim0 1
1
1
1 −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛< −
−
∞→
α
α
,t
,t
t
α
mν
α
c
c ϖ&  and 0<Ξ .                                 ■ 
 
Proposition 2-1 indicates that the current account deficit of economy 1 and the current account 
surplus of economy 2 continue indefinitely on the multilateral path. The condition 
( ) ( )[ ]
2
111 21 θθεαα
mν
α α
α +<−−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −ϖ  is generally satisfied for reasonable parameter values.  
 Conversely, the opposite is true for the trade balance. 
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Corollary 3-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, 0lim
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Proof: See Appendix 5. 
 
Corollary 3-1 indicates that, on the multilateral path, the trade surpluses of economy 1 continue 
indefinitely and vice versa. That is, goods and services are transferred from economy 1 to 
economy 2 in each period indefinitely in exchange for the returns on the accumulated current 
account deficits (i.e., debts) of economy 1. 
 Nevertheless, the trade balance of economy 1 is not a surplus from the beginning. 
Before Corollary 3-1 is satisfied, negative dsτ
t
s∫0  should be accumulated. In the early periods, 
when dsτ
t
s∫0  is small, the balance on goods and services of economy 1 ( dsτkyτ
t
s
t
t
t ∫∂∂− 0,2,2 ) 
continues to be a deficit. After a sufficient negative amount of dsτ
t
s∫0  is accumulated, the trade 
balances of economy 1 shift to surpluses. 
 
3.4.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
 Similarly, the value of Ξ in the heterogeneous risk aversion model is uniquely 
determined on the multilateral path. 
 
Lemma 3-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, 
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Proposition 2-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, 0<Ξ  if 
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parameter values.  
 
Corollary 3-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, 0lim
0
,2
,2 >⎟⎟⎠
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 By Lemma 3-2 and equations (21) and (22), the limit of the growth rate on the 
multilateral path is  
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3.4.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
 As Lemma 2-3 shows, on the multilateral path, either 0lim =∞→ tt τ  and 
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0=Ξ  and heterogeneous productivity does not result in permanent trade imbalances. However, 
on the latter path, trade imbalances usually grow at a higher rate than consumption, because 
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∞→∞→ = ; thus, Ξ explodes to infinity. Hence, the latter path will generally not be 
selected. The question of which path is selected is examined in detail in the Section 4.3. 
 
3.5  A model with heterogeneities in multiple elements 
 The three heterogeneities are not exclusive. It is particularly likely that heterogeneities 
in time preference and productivity coexist. Many empirical studies conclude that the rate of 
time preference is negatively correlated with income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991; Samwick, 1998; 
Ventura, 2003); this indicates that the economy with the higher productivity has a lower rate of 
time preference and vice versa. In this section, the models are extended to include heterogeneity 
in multiple elements. 
 Suppose that economies 1 and 2 are identical except for time preference, risk aversion, 
and productivity. The Hamiltonian for economy 1 is 
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and that for economy 2 is 
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The growth rates are 
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and the limit of the growth rate on the multilateral path is 
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 The sign of Ξ on the multilateral path depends on the relative values between θ1 and θ2, 
ε1 and ε2, and ω1 and ω2. Nevertheless, if the rate of time preference and productivity are 
negatively correlated, as argued above (i.e., if 21 θθ <  and 21 ωω >  while 21 εε = ), then by 
similar proofs as those presented for Proposition 2-1 and Corollary 3-1, if 
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on the multilateral path; that is, the current account deficits and trade surpluses of economy 1 
continue indefinitely. The condition ( ) ( )[ ]
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satisfied for reasonable parameter values.  
 
3.6  Multi-economy models 
 The two-economy models can be extended to include numerous economies that have 
differing degrees of heterogeneity.  
 
3.6.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
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 Suppose that there are H economies that are identical except for time preference. Let θi 
be the rate of time preference of economy i and tjiτ ,,  be the current account balance of 
economy i with economy j, where i = 1, 2, … , H, j = 1, 2, … , H, and i ≠ j. Because the total 
population is Lt, the population in each economy is 
H
Lt . The representative household of 
economy i maximizes its expected utility  
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subject to 
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for i ≠ j. 
 
Proposition 3-1: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneous time preference, if and only if  
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for any i, all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are satisfied at steady 
state, and  
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
Proof: See Appendix 6. 
 
3.6.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
 The heterogeneous risk aversion model can be extended to the multi-economy model 
by a proof similar to that for Proposition 3-1. Suppose that H economies are identical except for 
risk aversion, and their degrees of risk aversion are εi (i = 1, 2, … , H). 
 
Proposition 3-2: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if and only if  
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for any i, all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are satisfied at steady 
state, and 
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
 
3.6.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
 The heterogeneous productivity model can also be extended by a proof similar to that 
for Proposition 3-1. Suppose that H economies are identical except for productivity, and their 
productivities are ωi (i = 1, 2, … , H). Note that, because =+ tk ,21  ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +=+ 1
2
1
,2,2,1 ω
ωkkk ttt , the 
productivity of economy 1+2 is ( )αtααtααtt kωkωAy −−+ += 1,221,11,21  ( ) α tαtα kAωω −++= 1 ,2121 . 
 
Proposition 3-3: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneous productivity, if and only if 
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for any i, all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are satisfied at steady 
state, and 
 
t
t
t
ti
ti
t
ti
ti
t
ti
ti
t A
A
y
y
k
k
c
c &&&&
∞→∞→∞→∞→ === limlimlimlim
,
,
,
,
,
,  
 
for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
 
3.6.4  Heterogeneity in multiple elements 
 Similarly, the multi-economy model can be extended to heterogeneity in multiple 
elements, as follows. 
 
Proposition 3-4: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneity in multiple elements, if and only 
if  
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for any i (= 1, 2, … , H), all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are 
satisfied at steady state, and 
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
 
 Proposition 3-4 implies that the concept of the representative household in a 
heterogeneous population implicitly assumes that all households are on the multilateral path. 
 
3.7  Degeneration to an exogenous technology model 
 The multilateral paths in the endogenous growth models imply that similar sustainable 
states exist in exogenous technology models. However, this is true only for the heterogeneous 
time preference model, because, in exogenous technology models, the steady state means that 
θ
k
y
t
t =∂
∂ ; that is, the heterogeneity in risk aversion is irrelevant to the steady state, and the 
heterogeneous productivities do not result in permanent trade imbalances due to 
t
t
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y
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y
,2
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∂
∂=∂
∂ . Thereby, only heterogeneous time preference is relevant to sustainable 
heterogeneity in exogenous growth models. 
 If technology is exogenously given and constant (At = A), Hamiltonians for the 
heterogeneous time preference model shown in Section 2.2.1 degenerate to  
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By equations (10), (11), and (12), the growth rate of consumption in economy 1 is 
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If equation (38) holds, all the optimality conditions of both economies are indefinitely satisfied. 
This result is analogous to equation (29) and corresponds to the multilateral path in the 
endogenous growth models. The state indicated by equation (38) is called the “multilateral 
steady state” in the following discussion. 
 If both economies are not open and are isolated, 1
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 at steady state instead of the conditions shown in equation (38). Hence, at the 
multilateral steady state with 21 θθ < , the amount of capital in economy 1 is smaller than when 
the economy is isolated and vice versa. As a result, output and consumption in economy 1 are 
also smaller in the multilateral steady state with 21 θθ <  than when the economy is isolated. 
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 0lim
0
<∫∞→ dsτt st  ; 
 
that is, economy 1 possesses accumulated debts owed to economy 2 at steady state, and 
economy 1 has to export goods and services to economy 2 by 
 
( ) dsτkAα t sαtα ∫−− 0,11  
 
in every period to pay the debts. Nevertheless, because 0lim =∞→ tt τ  and 0=Ξ , the debts do 
not explode but stabilize at steady state. 
 In the multilateral steady state, all the optimality conditions of both economies are 
satisfied, and heterogeneity is therefore sustainable. However, this state will be economically 
less preferable for economy 1 as compared with the state of Becker (1980), because 
consumption is smaller and debts are owed. Which state should economy 1 select? A similar 
dilemma―whether to give priority to simultaneous optimality with economy 2 or to unilaterally 
optimal higher utility―will also arise in the endogenous growth models; this is examined in the 
following sections. 
 
4.  UNILATERAL BALANCED GROWTH 
 
 The multilateral path satisfies all the optimality conditions, but that does not mean that 
the two economies naturally select the multilateral path. Ghiglino (2002) predicts that it is likely 
that, under appropriate assumptions, the results of Becker (1980) still hold in endogenous 
growth models. Farmer and Lahiri (2005) show that balanced growth equilibria do not exist in a 
multi-agent economy in general, except in the special case that all agents have the same constant 
rate of time preference. How the economies behave in the environments described in Sections 2 
and 3 is examined in this section. 
 
4.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
 The multilateral path is not the only path on which all the optimality conditions of 
economy 1 are satisfied. Even if economy 1 behaves unilaterally, it can achieve optimality, but 
economy 2 cannot. 
 
Lemma 4-1: In the heterogeneous time preference model, if each economy sets tτ  without 
regarding the other economy’s optimality conditions, then it is not possible to satisfy all the 
optimality conditions of both economies. 
Proof: See Appendix 7. 
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at steady state, all the optimality conditions of economy 1 can be satisfied only if either 
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Conversely, economy 1 has two paths on which all its optimality conditions are satisfied. 
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economy 2 must initially set consumption such that ∞=02 ,c , which violates the optimality 
condition of economy 2. Therefore, unlike with the multilateral path, all the optimality 
conditions of economy 2 cannot be satisfied on the path satisfying equation (40) even though 
those of economy 1 can. Hence, economy 2 has only one path on which all its optimality 
conditions can be satisfied—the multilateral path. The path satisfying equation (40) is called the 
“unilateral balanced growth path” or the “unilateral path” in the following discussion. Clearly, 
heterogeneity in time preference is not sustainable on the unilateral path. 
 How should economy 2 respond to the unilateral behavior of economy 1? Possibly, 
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both economies negotiate for the trade between them, and some agreements may be reached. If 
no agreement is reached, however, and economy 1 never regards economy 2’s optimality 
conditions, economy 2 generally will fall into the following unfavorable situation. 
 
Remark 1-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if economy 1 does not regard the 
optimality conditions of economy 2, the ratio of economy 2’s debts (owed to economy 1) to its 
consumption explodes to infinity while all the optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied. 
 
The reasoning behind Remark 1-1 is as follows. When economy 1 selects the unilateral path and 
sets c1,0 so as to achieve this path, there are two options for economy 2. The first option is for 
economy 2 to also pursue its own optimality without regarding economy 1: that is, to select its 
own unilateral path. The second option is to adapt to the behavior of economy 1 as a follower. If 
economy 2 takes the first option, it sets c2,0 without regarding c1,0. As the proof of Lemma 4-1 
indicates, unilaterally optimal growth rates are different between the two economies and 
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∂ ϖ  and tt kk ,2,1 =  must be kept, capital and technology are 
equal and grow at the same rate in both economies. Hence, because 0,20,1 cc < , more capital is 
initially produced in economy 1 than in economy 2 and some of it will need to be exported to 
economy 2. As a result, 
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conditions of both economies cannot be satisfied. Since 
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capital soon becomes abundant in economy 2, and excess goods and services are produced in 
that economy. These excess products are exported to and utilized in economy 1. This process 
escalates as time passes because 
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almost all consumer goods and services produced in economy 2 are consumed by households in 
economy 1. These consequences will be unfavorable for economy 2. 
 If economy 2 takes the second option, it should set ∞=02 ,c  to satisfy all its 
optimality conditions, as the proof of Lemma 4-1 indicates. Setting ∞=02 ,c  is impossible, but 
economy 2 as the follower will initially set ,tc2  as large as possible. This action gives economy 
2 a higher expected utility than that of the first option, because consumption in economy 2 in the 
second case is always higher. As a result, economy 2 imports as many goods and services as 
possible from economy 1, and the trade deficit of economy 2 continues until 
( ) tt sα
α
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τ&  is achieved. The current 
account deficits and the accumulated debts of economy 2 will continue to increase indefinitely. 
Furthermore, they will increase more rapidly than the growth rate of outputs (
t
t
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) 
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because, in general, 
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disturbance occurs, the expansion of debts may be sustained forever, but economy 2 becomes 
extremely vulnerable to even a very tiny negative disturbance. If such a disturbance occurs, 
economy 2 will lose all its capital and will no longer be able to repay its debts. This result 
corresponds to the state shown by Becker (1980), and it will also be unfavorable for economy 2. 
Because ( ) 01lim
0
1 =⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∫−∞→ tt sα
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τdsτα
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αϖ , inequality (27) holds, and the transversality 
condition for economy 1 is satisfied by Lemma 1-1. Thus, all the optimality conditions of 
economy 1 are satisfied if economy 2 takes the second option. 
 As a result, all the optimality conditions of economy 2 cannot be satisfied in any case 
if economy 1 takes the unilateral path. Both options to counter the unilateral behavior of 
economy 1 are unfavorable for economy 2. However, the expected utility of economy 2 is 
higher if it takes the second option rather than the first, and economy 2 will choose the second 
option. Hence, if economy 1 does not regard economy 2’s optimality conditions, the debts owed 
by economy 2 to economy 1 increase indefinitely at a higher rate than consumption. 
 
4.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
 The same consequences are observed in this model. 
 
Lemma 4-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if each economy sets tτ  without 
regard for the other economy’s optimality conditions, then all the optimality conditions of both 
economies cannot be satisfied. 
 
Therefore, heterogeneity in risk aversion is not sustainable on the unilateral path. 
 
Remark 1-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if economy 1 does not regard 
economy 2’s optimality conditions, the ratio of economy 2’s debts (owed to economy 1) to its 
consumption explodes to infinity while all the optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied. 
 
4.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
 Unlike the heterogeneous preferences shown in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, heterogeneity in 
productivity can be sustainable even on the unilateral path. 
 
Lemma 4-3: In the heterogeneous productivity model, even if each economy sets tτ  without 
regard for the other economy’s optimality conditions, it is possible that all the optimality 
conditions of both economies are satisfied if 
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Proof: See Appendix 8. 
 
 All the optimality conditions of economy 1 can be satisfied only if either equation (31) 
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or (32) holds, because 
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 can be constant only when equation (31) or (32) holds. 
Equation (31) corresponds to the multilateral path, and equation (32) corresponds to the 
unilateral path. Unlike the heterogeneity in preferences, Lemma 4-3 shows that, even on the 
unilateral path, all the optimality conditions of both economies are satisfied because the limit of 
both economies’ growth rates is identical on the path of either equation (31) or (32), such that 
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,1 ϖ&& . Therefore, heterogeneity in productivity is 
sustainable even on the unilateral path. 
 Nevertheless, on the unilateral path, current account imbalances generally grow 
steadily at a higher rate than consumption; this is not the case on the multilateral path. How does 
economy 1 set τ? If economy 1 imports as many goods and services as possible before reaching 
the steady state at which ( ) ( ) ααt
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t ), the expected utility of economy 1 will be 
higher than it is in either case where 0>tτ  or in the multilateral path. However, the debts 
economy 1 owes to economy 2 will grow indefinitely at a higher rate than consumption, and the 
ratio of debt to consumption explodes to infinity. If there is no disturbance, this situation will be 
sustained forever, but economy 1 will become extremely vulnerable to even a very tiny negative 
disturbance. Hence, the unilateral path will not necessarily be favorable for economy 1 although 
all its optimality conditions are satisfied on this path, and economy 1 will prefer the multilateral 
path. 
 
Remark 1-3: In the heterogeneous productivity model, even though economy 1 does not regard 
economy 2’s optimality conditions, the multilateral balanced growth path will be selected. 
 
Hence, the state shown by Becker (1980) will not be observed in the case of heterogeneous 
productivity.  
 
5.  PATH SELECTION 
 
5.1  Political elements 
 The multilateral path will be naturally selected in the case of heterogeneous 
productivity, as shown in Section 4.3. However, in the case of heterogeneous preferences, the 
incentive for economy 1 to select the multilateral path will be weak. This is true even though 
both paths enable economy 1 to achieve optimality, because the growth rate of economy 1 on 
the multilateral path is lower than that on the unilateral path (although economy 1’s 
consumption on the unilateral path is initially smaller), and the expected utility of economy 1 on 
the multilateral path will not necessarily be larger than that on the unilateral path. 
 Furthermore, even though heterogeneous productivity naturally results in the 
multilateral path, heterogeneous productivity affects path selection through a different channel. 
As argued in Section 3.5, empirical studies indicate that it is highly likely that the rate of time 
preference is negatively correlated with productivity (e.g., Lawrance, 1991; Samwick, 1998; 
Ventura, 2003). Harashima (2009b) presents a model in which the rate of time preference is 
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determined endogenously by steady state consumption, and the rate of time preference and 
steady state consumption are negatively correlated. This probable negative correlation indicates 
that, even though heterogeneous productivity does not directly affect path selection, it will 
indirectly affect it through this correlation. 
 When economy 1 selects the unilateral path, does economy 2 quietly accept the 
unfavorable consequences discussed in Section 4? From an economic perspective, the optimal 
response of economy 2 is the one shown in Remarks 1-1 and 1-2: economy 2 should behave as a 
follower and accept the unfavorable consequences. However, if other factors—particularly 
political ones—are taken into account, the response of economy 2 will be different. Faced with 
a situation in which all the optimality conditions cannot be satisfied, it is highly likely that 
economy 2 would politically protest and resist economy 1. It should be emphasized economy 2 
is not responsible for its own non-optimality, which is a result of economy 1’s unilateral 
behavior in a heterogeneous population. Economy 2 may overlook the non-optimality if it is 
temporary, but it will not if it is permanent. Because Lemmas 4-1 and 4-2 and Remarks 1-1 and 
1-2 indicate that the non-optimality is permanent, it is quite likely that economy 2 will seriously 
resist economy 1 politically.  
 If economy 1 could achieve its optimality only on the unilateral path, economy 1 
would counter the resistance of economy 2, but this is not the case. Because of this, economy 
2’s demand does not necessarily appear to be unreasonable or selfish. Faced with the protest and 
resistance by economy 2, economy 1 may compromise or cooperate with economy 2 and select 
the multilateral path. 
 
5.2  Resistance 
 The main objective of economy 2 is to force economy 1 to select the multilateral path 
and to establish sustainable heterogeneity. This objective may be achieved through cooperative 
measures, non-violent civil disobedience (e.g., trade restrictions), or other more violent means. 
Restricting or abolishing trade between the two economies will cost economy 1 
because it necessitates a restructuring of the division of labor, and the restructuring will not be 
confined to a small scale. Large-scale adjustments will develop that involve all levels of divided 
labor, because they are all correlated with each other. For example, if an important industry had 
previously existed only in one economy, owing to a division of labor, and trade between the two 
economies was no longer permitted, the other economy would have to establish this industry 
while also maintaining other industries. As a result, economy 1 would incur non-negligible costs. 
More developed economies have more complicated and sophisticated divisions of labor, and 
restructuring costs from the disruption of trade will be much higher in developed economies. In 
addition, more resources will need to be allocated to the generation of technology because 
technology will also no longer be traded. Finally, all of the conventional benefits of trade will be 
lost. Trade is beneficial because of the heterogeneous endowment of resources, as the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem shows. Because goods and services are assumed to be uniform in the 
models presented in this paper, the benefits of trade are implicit in the models. However, in the 
real word, resources such as oil and other raw materials are unevenly distributed, so a disruption 
or restriction of trade will substantially damage economic activities on both national and 
international levels. 
 The damage done by trade restrictions has an upper limit, however, because the 
restructuring of the division of labor, additional resource allocation to innovation, and loss of 
trade benefits are all finite. Therefore, in some cases, particularly if economies are not 
sufficiently developed and division of labor is not complex, the damage caused will be 
relatively small. Hence, a disruption of trade (non-violent civil disobedience in the national 
models) may not be sufficiently effective as a means of resistance under some these conditions.
  
In some cases, harassment, sabotage, intimidation, and violence may be used, whether 
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legal or illegal. In extreme cases, war or revolution could ensue. In such cases, economy 1 will 
be substantially damaged in many ways and be unable to achieve optimality. The resistance and 
resulting damages will continue until sustainability is established. 
 In any case, the objective of economy 2’s resistance conversely implies that 
establishing sustainability eliminates the risk and cost of political and social instability. The 
resistance of economy 2 will lower the desire of economy 1 to select the unilateral path. 
 
5.3  The path selection model 
 The arguments in Section 5.2 imply that the path selection of economy 1 needs to be 
made fully considering the possibility of resistance by economy 2. Economy 1 will act to 
minimize the loss caused by the resistance minus the utility gain attributed to taking unilateral 
action. The political loss function of the representative household of economy 1 is 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∫∞ −−−−= 0 111exp dthccGDGpγtθΓ t,M,t,U,ttt  , 
 
where ( )•γ  is the instantaneous political loss function of economy 1 (γ′> 0 and γ′′< 0); U,tc ,1  
and M,tc ,1  are the levels of consumption for economy 1 on the unilateral and multilateral paths, 
respectively; ( )10 ≤≤ pp  is the probability of the occurrence of resistance by economy 2; D 
(≥ 0) is the damage done to economy 1 by the resistance of economy 2; Gt (≥ 0) indicates the 
gap between the multilateral path and the current path; and ht is the stream of economy 1’s 
consumption adjustments to reduce p. ( ) ( )tt GDGp  represents the loss and ,M,t,U,t cc 11 −  
represents the gain from taking unilateral actions. The loss and gain are evaluated by the 
instantaneous political loss function γ additively discounted indefinitely by θ1 from the present 
to the future, balanced with the control variable ht. 
 D indicates the sum of the economic values of various types of damage (e.g., physical, 
mental, and financial losses), opportunity costs, and similar items. In addition, 
( ) ( ) ,U,ttt cδGD 1ϕ= , ( ) 0>
t
t
d
dδ
ϕ
ϕ , and ( ) 00 =δ , where 
,M,t
t
t c
G
2
=ϕ  and M,tc ,2  is economy 
2’s consumption on the multilateral path. That is, as economy 2 perceives that the magnitude of 
the gap (
,M,t
t
t c
G
2
=ϕ ) increases, economy 2 intensifies its resistance, and as the scale of 
economy 1’s consumption ,U,tc1  increases, the scale of economy 1’s damage increases. The 
gap is defined as tMtt ggG ,−= , where ∫= t st dsg 0τ  (i.e., economy 1’s accumulated 
lending to economy 2), and tMg ,  is gt on the multilateral path. As Remarks 1-1 and 1-2 
indicate, if economy 1 behaves unilaterally, the ratio of economy 2’s debts owed to economy 1 
( ∫−=− t st dsg 0τ ) to its consumption explodes to infinity. Thus, Gt reflects the distance from 
the multilateral path. Like the damage ( )tδ ϕ , the probability of the occurrence of resistance p 
is a function of 
,M,t
t
t c
G
2
=ϕ : ( )tp ϕ , for example, ( ) Πtp −+−= 11 ϕ , where ( )0>Π  is a 
constant. In addition, ( ) 0>∂
∂
t
tp
ϕ
ϕ , ( ) 00 =p , and ( ) 1=∞p . Finally, the adjustment ht is the 
tool of economy 1 to control p and bring the consumption stream of economy 1 closer to that on 
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the multilateral path; thus, ∫= t st dsg 0τ  and Gt decrease, as does p, because ( ) 0>∂∂ t t
p
ϕ
ϕ . The 
adjustment ht indicates the behavior of economy 1 such that, by consuming more goods and 
services by ht, capital and technology are not accumulated as quickly as on the unilateral path, 
and economy 1’s lending ( ∫= t st dsg 0τ )—the reverse of which is economy 2’s debts 
( ∫−=− t st dsg 0τ )—increases less rapidly. The adjustment ht eventually becomes positive (i.e., 
0lim >∞→ tt h ), but it has an upper boundary such that 1lim
11
≤−∞→ ,M,t,U,t
t
t cc
h . The fully adjusted 
path ( 1lim
11
=−∞→ ,M,t,U,t
t
t cc
h ) equals the multilateral path. If economy 1 wishes to lower p, ht is 
increased. Accordingly, 0lim ≤
∞→
t
t
t dh
dG  and 0→tG  as 1
11
→− ,M,t,U,t
t
cc
h . 
 The nature of ht shown above indicates that the gap tMtt ggG ,−=  is a 
monotonously continuous function of ht; thus, ( )[ ] ( )ttt hphGp =  and ( )[ ] =tt hGδ  ( )thδ . 
Particularly, these functions are specified here as  
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As is true with 
,M,t
t
t c
G
2
=ϕ , ht is standardized by M,tc ,2  because economy 2 initiates and 
increases the level of resistance based on information on the magnitude of the adjusted deviation 
from M,tc ,2  (i.e., 
,M,t
t
c
h
2
) through perceiving the gap (
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=ϕ ). In addition, because 
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h , then the two functions (equations [41] and 
[42]) have the following properties: 
 ( )
0lim
2
2 <∞→
,tc
,tc
t
,M,t
,M,t
dh
hdp  and ( ) 0lim
2
2 <∞→
,tc
,tc
t
,M,t
,M,t
dh
hd δ               (43) 
 
and 
 
( ) 0lim
2
=∞→ ,tct ,M,thp  and ( ) 0lim 2 =∞→ ,tct ,M,thδ  ⇔  1lim
11
=−∞→ ,M,t,U,t
t
t cc
h  .     (44) 
 
Property (44) reflects the criterion for putting up resistance―whether sustainable heterogeneity 
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is established or not. If it is established, no resistance occurs, but if it is not established or 
broken, resistance occurs. The rationale for this criterion is that without sustainability all the 
optimality conditions of economy 2 are not satisfied. 
 Putting together all of the above elements, the model of path selection is constructed 
as follows. The representative household of economy 1 minimizes expected net political loss 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∫ ∞ −−−−= 0 1111 22exp dthccchδhpγtθEΓE t,M,t,U,t,U,t,tc,tc ,M,t,M,t  . 
 
 Note that the political loss function is completely different from the social welfare 
function. The political loss function does not indicate a social ranking of states but rather the 
preference ranking of each individual evaluated on the basis of the criterion of sustainability, 
because sustainability is evaluated not by society but by each individual household. Whether the 
multilateral path is optimal for the society or not, the path selection is made through each 
individual’s optimization on the basis of the political loss function.  
 
5.4  The optimal path selection for economy 1 
 The optimality condition for the minimization problem of economy 1 is 0=
tdh
dΓ  for 
any t; that is, economy 1 should set ht to satisfy 
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for any t. The stream of ht depends on the functional forms of ( ),tc ,M,thp 2  and ( ),tc ,M,thδ 2 . 
Nevertheless, by equation (45), 
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because U,tc ,1  grows more rapidly than ,M,tc 2 , and the path of economy 1 converges to the 
multilateral path as Proposition 4 shows. 
 
Proposition 4: On the path that satisfies the optimality condition (equation [45]), 
1lim
11
=−∞→ ,M,t,U,t
t
t cc
h . 
Proof: Because of equation (46) and property (43), ( )=
∞→ ,tct ,M,t
hp
2
lim  ( ) 0lim
2
=
∞→ ,tct ,M,t
hδ  on the 
path that satisfies equation (45). Therefore, by property (44), 1lim
11
=−∞→ ,M,t,U,t
t
t cc
h .      ■ 
 
Proposition 4 indicates that, because of the non-zero probability of political conflicts, the path of 
economy 1 eventually must equal the multilateral path; this means that sustainable heterogeneity 
is naturally established in any case. In modern industrialized countries that have large middle 
class populations, the state Becker (1980) indicates has not been observed; this implies that the 
multilateral path has been actually selected in those countries. 
 However, Proposition 4 depends on properties (43) and (44), so even a very small 
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deviation of economy 1 from sustainable heterogeneity generates resistance. If properties (43) 
and (44) are replaced such that ( ) 0
2
=,tc ,M,thp , ( ) 02 =,tc ,M,thδ , ( ) 0
2
2 =
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,tc
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( )
0
2
2 =
,tc
,tc
,M,t
,M,t
dh
hdδ  even if 1lim
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h , then the multilateral path is not necessarily 
naturally selected. For example, suppose that ( ) 0
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dh
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≥ , and ( ) 0
2
2 =
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dh
hdδ  if ,t, δc,tc ,M,t,M,t hh 22 ≤ , where p,t,c ,M,th 2  and ,t, δc ,M,th 2  
are constants and ,t, δcp,t,c ,M,t,M,t hh 22 < . That is, even if the path is not adjusted fully such that 
p,t,c,tc ,M,t,M,t
hh
22
≥ , economy 2 tolerates non-optimality and does not attempt any resistance. In 
addition, the effect of economy 2’s resistance has an upper boundary ( ),t, δc ,M,thδ 2  because the 
political power of economy 2 is weak and/or economy 1 can politically constrain the resistance. 
With these properties, economy 1 can satisfy equation (46) by setting ht at p,t,c ,M,th 2  even if it 
behaves unilaterally. This example implies that the conditions for the multilateral path do not 
necessarily have to be selected. 
 
Remark 2: The multilateral balanced growth path will not necessarily be selected by economy 
1 if economy 2 hesitates to resist the unilateral behavior of economy 1, if economy 2’s political 
power to resist is limited, or if economy 1 can politically constrain economy 2’s resistance.  
 
6.  ESTABLISHING SUSTAINABLE 
HETEROGENEITY 
 
 As Section 5.2 shows, less advantaged economies will pursue the establishment of the 
multilateral path. In addition, even though minimization of the political loss function does not 
require the presumption that sustainable heterogeneity is optimal for society, sustainability 
implies a normative ingredient. This is because it seems likely that many people will agree that 
the state in which all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous people are indefinitely 
satisfied is socially preferable for the fundamental good of society. If a society regards 
sustainable heterogeneity as such, it has to endeavor to establish and maintain sustainability. 
 
6.1 The fragility of sustainable heterogeneity 
 For a variety of reasons, establishing and maintaining sustainable heterogeneity are not 
necessarily easy tasks. A problem is the lack of a market in which “index futures” of the 
resistance are exchanged. Without a market, information on the probability p and the damage δ 
is not sufficiently transmitted and is imperfect to economy 1. As a result of the imperfect 
information, p and δ are evaluated differently in economies 1 and 2, and economy 1 will 
incorrectly expect economy 2’s actions and may mistakenly act unilaterally. Furthermore, 
information obtained by economy 2 on economy 1’s behavior becomes biased, because 
economy 1’s evaluations of p and δ are biased as a result of the imperfect information. Because 
of the lack of a market and the resulting imperfect nature of the information, economy 2 may 
resist seriously even though economy 1 actually selects the multilateral path. In the sense that 
markets cannot solve this problem, this fragility can be regarded as a kind of market failure. To 
secure sustainable heterogeneity, therefore, some artificial mechanisms will be required. 
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 In addition, Remark 2 indicates that economy 2’s hesitation to resist and lack of 
political power to resist, and economy 1’s political power to constrain the resistance, may mean 
that the multilateral path will not always be selected. A reason for the hesitation is that the 
resistance also hurts economy 2. In some cases, the resistance may harm economy 2 more than 
economy 1. Taking this risk into account, economy 2 may hesitate to resist if the deviation of 
economy 1 from sustainable heterogeneity is relatively small. In this paper, the political loss 
function of economy 2 is not explicitly modeled for simplicity, but it is represented by ( )tc M,thp ,,2  and ( ),tc ,M,thδ 2  in the political loss function of economy 1. Actually, however, not 
only tc M,th ,,2  and tc M,th ,,2 , but also various other political and social factors, will affect p and δ. 
Under some political and social circumstances (e.g., living in a totalitarian state), resistance may 
instead totally damage economy 2; therefore, for practical reasons, economy 2 may not be able 
to resist. In democratic societies, the costs of resistance for economy 2 will be substantially 
lower than that in non-democratic societies. However, in any case, economy 2 will have many 
minor political and social frictions or rigidities. For example, all present democratic countries 
have adopted indirect democracy; minority voices are often neglected, and sometimes even 
majority voices are neglected during the period between elections. In these cases, people cannot 
resist through voting. In addition, there may be psychological barriers in small rural 
communities. If there are such political and social frictions, they may have to be removed, for 
example, through the intervention of social welfare authorities. 
 
6.2  United economies 
 An important countermeasure to the fragility of sustainable heterogeneity for less 
advantaged economies is the formation of a union of economies. If economies other than 
economy 1 are united by commonly selecting the multilateral path within them, their power to 
resist economy 1 will be substantially enhanced. Consider the multi-economy model shown in 
Section 3.6.4. If the economies do not form a union, the power to resist the unilateral actions of 
economy 1 is divided and limited to the power of each individual economy. However, if the 
economies are united, the power to resist economy 1 increases. If a sufficient number of 
economies unite, the multilateral path will almost certainly be selected by economy 1. 
 To maintain the union, any economy in the union should have the explicit and 
resolved intention of selecting the multilateral path within the union, even if it is relatively more 
advantaged within the union. To demand that relatively more advantaged economies select the 
multilateral path, less advantaged economies themselves must also select the multilateral path in 
any case. Otherwise, less advantaged economies will be divided and ruled by more advantaged 
economies. For all heterogeneous people to happily coexist, all of them should behave 
multilaterally. At the same time, Section 3.6 indicates that the more advantaged an economy is, 
the more modestly it should behave, i.e., the more it should restrain itself from accumulating 
extra capitals. 
 The fragility of sustainable heterogeneity will also be mitigated by the formation of an 
economic union. With the union, economy 1 will be able to obtain more perfect information on 
p and δ, because the behavior of the united economies will be more visible and recognizable to 
economy 1 than the dispersed behaviors of many small economies.  
 Note that economy 1 may also unite with economies that have similar preferences to 
counter the increased political power of the united economies that have different preferences. As 
a result, economies will converge to two united economies, and there will be a political struggle 
over sustainability. This struggle may be viewed as a “class struggle,” for example, between 
labor and capital or between developing and developed countries. 
 
6.3  Interventions for social welfare 
 The fragility of sustainable heterogeneity will not be completely eliminated only by 
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the formation of economic unions, because the power to resist economy 1 may not be increased 
sufficiently by forming a union, and because the fragility is caused not only by weak resistance 
but also by imperfect information. To correct the problem of imperfect information and secure 
sustainability, intervention by the authority is justified. Sorger (2002) shows that, if the 
authority levies a progressive income tax or if there are few households of each type and thus 
they are not simple price takers but play a Nash equilibrium, the results shown by Becker (1980) 
do not hold. Ghiglino (2002) argues that the latter case of Sorger (2002) can be interpreted as a 
model of international trade with a common market simply by associating each household’s 
type to an economy with a national central planner or a representative household. 
 
6.3.1  Taxes and transfers 
 The problem of imperfect information can be partly corrected if the authority 
substitutes for households in the allocation of resources. As shown in Section 4, more capital is 
accumulated when economy 1 selects the unilateral path than the multilateral path. If taxes are 
levied on the incomes or directly on the extra accumulated capital in economy 1, the allocation 
of resources will change and the extra accumulated capital will be reduced. With the forced 
capital reduction, the benefits of acting unilaterally are diminished, and economy 1 will be less 
willing to select the unilateral path. The use of taxes therefore can mitigate the problem of 
imperfect information and secure the selection of the multilateral path. Moreover, if tax 
revenues from economy 1 are transferred to economy 2, economy 2 can reduce ∫= t st dsg 0τ  
and tMtt ggG ,−= . Hence, the effect of intervention by the authority to mitigate the 
imperfection of information is almost doubled.  
 There is, however, a practical problem in levying such taxes. The taxes require 
identification of the households that belong to economy 1. Such identification is not a problem 
in international models, but it is in national models because households of various economies 
are mixed and can be difficult to distinguish. However, if productivity is heterogeneous, the 
economy to which a household belongs will be easily discerned by differences in income. In 
addition, because productivity is probably negatively correlated with the rate of time preference 
(as argued in Section 3.5), households with different rates of time preference will also be 
distinguished by income differences. Therefore, if income taxes are progressive, they can be 
selectively levied more heavily on the incomes of economy 1, even in national models. 
Inheritance taxes are also effective for this purpose. 
 
6.3.2  Affirmative actions 
 Unlike taxes and transfers, the aim of affirmative actions is to directly alter the 
attributes of economies. If production opportunities in economy 1 are constrained and those in 
economy 2 are enhanced by the authority’s interventions, productivity in economy 1 decreases 
and that in economy 2 increases. Suppose that there is heterogeneity in productivity between the 
two economies and productivity negatively correlates with the rate of time preference and also 
that, by affirmative actions, ω1, ω2, θ1, and θ2 are changed to be ( )11~ ωω < , ( )22~ ωω > , ( )11~ θθ > , 
and ( )22~ θθ < . By equation (36), the growth rate of economy 1 on the unilateral path is 
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growth rate of the unilateral path decreases, which means that the benefits of and the incentive 
for selecting the unilateral path for economy 1 are reduced. As a result, the probabilities of 
selecting the unilateral path and the degree of imperfection of information are lowered. In 
addition, this action will signal the authority’s strong determination to pursue the multilateral 
path. 
 However, the affirmative action shown above will generally cause overall productivity 
to decline such that 2121 ~~ ωωωω +>+ . Hence, by equation (36), the growth rate of the 
multilateral path is also lowered. In this sense, affirmative action may be more controversial 
than taxes and transfers as the means of securing sustainable heterogeneity. 
 
6.4  Voluntary donations 
 Voluntary donations from economy 1 to economy 2 will also be effective in mitigating 
the fragility. The amount of capital increases more rapidly on the unilateral path than on the 
multilateral path in economy 1, and voluntary donations indicate that economy 1 has explicitly 
abandoned a part of this extra capital accumulation instead of implicitly reducing it by 
increasing consumption. This explicit action signals that economy 1 is selecting the multilateral 
path. With this signal, information becomes less imperfect and sustainable heterogeneity will be 
more firmly secured. Voluntary donations are often supposed to have their root in altruism, 
which has been rationalized in various ways (e.g., Becker, 1977; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). 
The models in this paper provide an alternative rationale for altruism—voluntary donations are 
rational because they mitigate fragility and secure sustainable heterogeneity. 
 In international models, voluntary donations correspond to international aid to and 
debt relief for developing countries. If these actions are taken by an international organization 
(e.g., the United Nations, the World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund), they can be 
interpreted as the authority’s intervention for the welfare of the international society. 
 
6.5  Inequality 
6.5.1  Inevitable inequality for sustainable heterogeneity 
 Sustainable heterogeneity, on the other hand, is inevitably accompanied by inequality 
in consumption, particularly if productivity is heterogeneous. As Section 3 shows, this 
inequality is justified from the point of view of sustainability. There is a unique “optimal” 
degree of inequality. The upper boundary of the authority’s interventions is the state at which 
sustainability is secured across heterogeneous households, not the state at which an even income 
or wealth distribution occurs. Interventions that help economy 2 become more advantaged than 
it is on the multilateral path are harmful for sustainability. The authority’s intervention should 
not eliminate inequality, or optimality will not be achieved and the problem of moral hazard will 
be exacerbated. Too much equality, therefore, is as unfavorable as too much inequality for 
maintaining sustainability. 
 However, inequality in consumption does not necessarily mean that less advantaged 
households are unhappy because, even with the inequality, all the optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are indefinitely satisfied. Even though they are less advantaged, 
people can continue to live normally without behaving counter to their own preferences and will 
not be dominated by more advantaged people. Hence, they may feel sufficiently happy even 
though their consumption is relatively small. Sustainable heterogeneity therefore will 
accomplish equality in “happiness” in the sense that all the heterogeneous people equally 
achieve optimality. 
 
6.5.2  Inequality and growth 
 Consumption inequality emerges particularly when productivity is heterogeneous. At 
the same time, productivity is most likely negatively correlated with the rate of time preference. 
 42
Hence, in this section, inequality is examined for the case where 21 ωω >  and 21 θθ < . As 
shown in Section 3.5, on the multilateral path, the levels of consumption in economies 1 and 2 
grow at the same rate, but consumption is higher in economy 1 because 21 ωω > . Nevertheless, 
the trade surpluses of economy 1 continue permanently, and the goods and services produced in 
economy 1 are partly consumed in economy 2 because 21 θθ < . Inequality is mitigated by this 
trade imbalance between the two economies. On the unilateral path, on the other hand, the 
growth rate is higher than that of the multilateral path, and consumption of economy 1 is higher 
than that in economy 2. Because the debts economy 2 owes to economy 1 increase to infinity 
(because 21 θθ < ), all capital in economy 2 will be taken by economy 1 if even a very tiny 
negative disturbance occurs. The multilateral path appears to result in a lower rate of growth but 
also shows a lower degree of inequality than the unilateral path. This result implies that 
inequality and growth are positively correlated. 
 However, the correlation is not simple. The growth rate on the multilateral path is  
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by equation (36), and it is determined by the absolute values of 21 ωω +  and 
21
2211
ωω
ωθωθ
+
+ . 
Conversely, the degree of inequality is determined by the relative differences between ω1 and 
ω2 and θ1 and θ2. The correlations between the absolute values and the relative differences are 
intrinsically unclear, and the correlation between inequality and growth is also basically unclear. 
As discussed in the Introduction, empirical results about this correlation have been inconclusive 
(e.g., Alesina und Rodrik, 1994; Persson und Tabellini, 1994; Clarke, 1995; Deininger and 
Squire, 1998; Forbes, 2000; Barro, 2000; Voitchovsky, 2005); this may be attributed to this 
intrinsic unclearness. 
 Nevertheless, if there is a tendency such that the relative differences between ω1 and 
ω2 and θ1 and θ2 are relatively small in a country with a relatively high absolute value of 
21 ωω +  and lower absolute value of 
21
2211
ωω
ωθωθ
+
+ , a negative correlation between inequality 
and growth will be observed in cross-sectional data of a pool of a large number of countries that 
include both industrialized and developing countries. That is, if households in industrialized 
countries are more homogeneous and productive than those in developing countries, inequality 
in industrialized countries is relatively low and at the same time industrialized countries can 
grow more rapidly. The negative correlation is reported empirically by, for example, Persson 
and Tabellini (1994), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Clarke (1995), and Deininger and Squire 
(1998). However, to complete the explanation, the reason why households with relatively high 
productivities are more homogeneous has to be shown. One possible reason is that the values of 
ω1 and ω2 have upper boundaries, and their distributions among economies are not normal. 
 On the other hand, the models in this paper predict that positive correlations between 
inequality and growth will be observed in time-series data focusing on subsets of 
countries—particularly industrialized countries. If economic deregulations indicate that the 
unilateral path is partly allowed by the authority to achieve a higher rate of growth, deregulation 
will increase both inequality and growth. In recent decades, many industrialized countries have 
continued to deregulate their economies. Hence, positive correlations may be observed if recent 
time-series data in industrial countries are used. Such correlations have been reported by Forbes 
(2000), Barro (2000), and Voitchovsky (2005). 
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7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 This paper studies social welfare in a heterogeneous population under the criteria of 
efficiency and sustainability. Becker (1980) showed that, if time preference is heterogeneous, 
the most patient household eventually will own all capital and substantial inequality emerges. 
Although this state is Pareto efficient, less patient households cannot achieve optimality. The 
endogenous growth models in this paper indicate that a multilateral balanced growth path exists 
on which all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are indefinitely satisfied, 
and that heterogeneity is sustainable on this path. However, sustainable heterogeneity is socially 
fragile and is not necessarily naturally obtained, because a unilateral balanced growth path also 
exists that is not sustainable and causes political conflicts. An advantaged economy can achieve 
optimality on both the unilateral and multilateral paths, whereas less advantaged economies can 
only do so on the multilateral path. In this paper, path selection is modeled using a political loss 
function. If less advantaged economies unite and the authority utilizes various measures such as 
progressive taxes, financial transfers, and affirmative actions, the multilateral path is secured. 
Voluntary donations are also effective in this regard.  
 The existence of a unique multilaterally balanced growth path is essential for 
sustainable heterogeneity. The importance of the existence of such a path has not previously 
been examined, because most studies on social welfare have not focused on heterogeneities in 
preferences and productivity, but further study of this path should shed new light on problems in 
the field of social welfare. 
 Sustainable heterogeneity has several important implications. The state where all the 
optimality conditions of all households are indefinitely satisfied cannot be achieved in a 
heterogeneous population relying only on markets. As Sections 5 and 6 indicate, political 
aspects should be fully considered in addition to markets, and the authority needs to intervene in 
the economy to achieve sustainability. Recently, criticisms of so-called “market 
fundamentalism” have been rampant, particularly after the financial crisis that began in 2008 
(e.g., Gray, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002, 2009; Soros, 2008). Many of these criticisms are journalistic 
and emotional and lack theoretical foundations, but sustainable heterogeneity implies that the 
spirit of the criticisms can be supported in a heterogeneous population if market fundamentalism 
is the doctrine endorsing the unilateral path. Less advantaged economies are not responsible for 
their non-optimality on the unilateral path. The non-optimality is caused because the advantaged 
economy behaves unilaterally in a heterogeneous population. 
 Sustainable heterogeneity also provides a rationale for the behaviors such as sacrifice 
and altruism. Selecting the multilateral path may economically represent a sacrifice of one’s 
own interests and even a benefit to hostile people, because households in the advantaged 
economy accept a lower growth rate for the welfare of those in less advantaged economies. This 
behavior, however, is beneficial not only to the less advantaged economies economically but 
also to the more advantaged economies politically, and the more advantaged an economy is, the 
more modestly it should behave. In this sense, the altruistic behavior is rational (see e.g., Trivers, 
1971; Becker, 1977; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Nowak, 2006). The multilateral path achieved 
by rational sacrifice and altruism minimizes the probability of political conflicts and leads to a 
politically and economically harmonized society in which all of the optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are indefinitely satisfied. 
 Sustainable heterogeneity also has important implications for globalization. 
Globalization has been viewed favorably from the economic point of view, but it has been 
controversial from some political points of view. Particularly, its impacts on inequality have 
been debated intensely (e.g., Klein, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002). The models in this paper imply that, if 
there is no heterogeneity, globalization will be basically favorable. If there is heterogeneity, 
however, this will not necessarily be true. Unless sustainable heterogeneity is achieved and 
maintained, political protest and resistance will arise. The enhancement of globalization 
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therefore should be consistent with sustainable heterogeneity. All economies should behave 
multilaterally, and measures to mitigate the fragility of sustainability (e.g., giving aid to and 
debt relief for developing countries) should be taken. 
 Inequality in consumption is necessary for sustainability, and there is a unique 
sustainable level of inequality. Therefore, the authority’s interventions should work towards 
achieving sustainability across heterogeneous households, not ensuring even income and wealth 
distributions. If the interventions go too far, optimality will not be achieved and the problem of 
moral hazard will be exacerbated. However, although consumption is relatively small for less 
advantaged people, they are not necessarily unhappy, because all of their optimality conditions 
are indefinitely satisfied. They can continue to live normally without behaving counter to their 
preferences, and they will not be dominated by more advantaged people. Sustainable 
heterogeneity therefore will accomplish equality in “happiness.” 
 The concept of sustainable heterogeneity may be used as a supplement to the concept 
of GDP as a measure of social welfare, because welfare can be evaluated by both efficiency and 
sustainability. The use of GDP as a measure of social welfare has been criticized for not 
sufficiently reflecting people’s happiness (e.g., Sen, 1976; Arrow et al., 1995). Indeed, if the 
unilateral path is selected, efficiency improves more rapidly and GDP will grow faster than 
when the multilateral path is selected, but less advantaged economies cannot achieve optimality. 
In this situation, many people will be unhappy even though the GDP per capita is higher. If 
GDP is modified for measures of sustainable heterogeneity or a new measurement that 
combines GDP and sustainable heterogeneity is constructed, it may be possible to more 
correctly measure the magnitude of people’s happiness in a heterogeneous population. 
 Heterogeneous productivity almost certainly is an important cause of many 
phenomena regarding economic inequality (e.g., Prescott, 1998; Hall and Jones, 1999). In 
addition, heterogeneous productivity is highly likely to be negatively correlated with a 
heterogeneous rate of time preference. Hence, the concept of rational sacrifice and altruism, 
which is useful for the problems caused by heterogeneous productivity and time preference, will 
be applicable to a wide range of problems that arise owing to economic inequality. Moreover, 
because many political conflicts have their roots in economic problems, this concept and the 
criterion of sustainability may also provide clues to the resolution of many such conflicts. 
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2  Proof of Lemma 2-1 
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3  Proof of Corollary 1-1  
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4  Proof of Lemma 3-1 
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5  Proof of Corollary 3-1 
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6  Proof of Proposition 3-1  
(Step 1) Suppose first that H is 3. Among the three economies, economies 1 and 2 are on the 
multilateral path. Their growth rate is ( )
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21 θθ + . Let this integrated economy be economy 1+2. Because economies 1+2 and 
3 are fully open to each other, returns on investments in both economies are kept equal through 
arbitration such that  
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Because equation (A1) is always held through arbitration, equations tt kk ,3,21 =+ , 
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(Step 2) By applying the same procedures shown in the proofs of Proposition 1-1, Lemmas 1-1 
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 Applying the same procedures as the case of economies 1+2 and 3 to the case of 
economies 1+2+3 and 4 when H = 4, similar properties can be shown to hold between 
economies 1+2+3 and 4. Iterating the same procedures, similar properties can be shown to hold 
for economy 1+2+…+H.                                                      ■ 
  
7  Proof of Lemma 4-1  
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When tτ  is set independently by each economy, tτ  is a control variable in addition to ct for 
each economy. Hence, the optimality condition  
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is commonly added to the optimality conditions of each economy. Here, by Proposition 1-1, if 
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8  Proof of Lemma 4-3  
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in either case; thus,  
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